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DOCKET NO *RO/J^OLSEN, M C I F F & CHAMBERLAIN 
AT'TOftt lEYS AT LAW 
TEX R. O L S E N 
K E N C H A M B E R L A I N 
KAY L. M c l F F 
R I C H A R D K. C H A M B E R L A I N 
2 2 5 N O R T H I O O EAST 
P O S T O F F I C E BOX IOO 
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701 
February 13, 1990 
T E L E P H O N E 8 0 1 - 8 9 6 - 4 4 6 1 
T E L E F A X 8 0 I - 8 9 6 - 5 4 4 I 
The Honorable Gordon R. Hall 
Chief Justice 
Utah State Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
lei, .• _rf - - ' : 
FEB 1 A 19^0 
! 
.y 
Re: UDOT vs. Ogden, et al. 
Case No. 890173 
Dear Mr. Chief Justice: 
With respect to the above referenced matter, please 
find ten copies of the following documents from the trial court: 
1. Findings and Conclusions (consolidated cases); 
2. Supplement to Findings and Conclusions 
(consolidated cases); 
3. Order Fixing Valuation Date and Providing for 
Payment of Interest (Ogden case); ^ 
4. Order Fixing Valuation Date and Providing for 
Payment of Interest (Lind case); 
5. Order Fixing Valuation Date and Providing for 
Payment of Interest (Springer case); and 
6. Order Fixing Valuation Date and Providing for 
Payment of Interest (LAYGO case). 
At the time of oral argument the Court indicated that 
these documents had not been submitted. 
Yours very truly, 
OLSEN, MclFF & CHAMBERLAIN 
By l Y^h%m 
Ken Chamberlain 
KC:sb 
E n d s . 
KEN CHAMBEBlJMti 
TEX R. OLSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants Orj^ en, 
Lind, Laygo, Springer 
225 North 100 East 
F. 0. Box 100 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Teler-hone: Q01 896-5441 
}.M THE S l A i i i -.'TJDICIA'. '...-., i S< - .' ; • 
STATE OF UTAH 
•-' t Prt COUNTY 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
vs 
Plaintiff, 
WALTER M. OGDEN AND SONS, 
INC., and SEVIER COUNTY 
TREASURER, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Civi 86-8-9H> • 
vs. 
hVJC 
his wife, Trustor; CORPORATION 
OF THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF 
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST CF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, Beneficiar', : 
and SEVIER COUNTY TREASURER/ 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 10128 
vs. 
LAYGO COMPANY, a partnership 
CHRISTIE RICHARDS, JANICE 
PARKER, LEANE JARRETTE, and 
JEAN YOUNG, 
Civil No. 10132 
Defendant. 
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vs. 
J. D. SPRINGER, 
Defendant, 
Civil No, 10131 
Pursuant to the stipulation of all counsel the above-
referenced matters came before the Court, sitting without a jury, 
beginning Thursday, March 9, 1989, and continuing through Monday, 
March 13. 
The four cases were informally consolidated for hearing 
on motions filed by each of the Defendants requesting the Court 
to fix a valuation date other than the date of service of 
summons. Further, the petitions requested the Court to require 
payment of interest from the valuation date fixed by the Court 
rather than the date the Orders of Immediate Occupancy were 
entered. 
The Court has carefully considered the evidence adduced 
during the three days of hearings and has further considered the 
extensive memoranda filed and the cases cited therein, including 
particularly the Utah cases which have dealt with the valuation 
date as well as payment of interest. 
In order to properly treat the Defendants' motions the 
Court is called upon to make factual findings, legal rulings and 
to resolve several mixed questions of law and fact. No effort 
has been made to compartmentalize these. 
With the foregoing introduction the Court finds and 
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concludes as follows, to-wit: 
1. The Court concludes that the constitutional 
requirement of "just compensation" set forth in Article I, §22 of 
the Utah Constitution takes precedence over §78-34-9 & 11, and 
that the latter cannot be strictly applied if such application 
would undermine the constitutional requirement. 
2. The Court concludes that §78-34-11 creates a 
rebuttable presumption that the date for determining valuation in 
eminent domain cases is the date of service of process. In 
reaching this conclusion the Court has relied upon and is in 
agreement with the opinion of Justice Stewart in Utah State Road 
Comfn vs. Fribera, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984). 
3. After carefully considering all of the evidence 
adduced the Court finds and concludes that if the trier of fact 
were required to value Defendants' properties as of the date of 
service of summons it would not lead to an award of "just 
compensation" as required by the constitution. 
4. The Court concludes that June 22, 1977, should be 
the date of valuation in these cases. This is the date when the 
Environmental Impact Statement was officially approved by federal 
authorities and the general corridor west of Richfield and 
through these Defendants1 properties was finally selected, 
5. The Court finds that there is a close relationship 
between the date the corridor was officially selected on June 22, 
1977, and the time frame in which these Defendants' properties 
could reasonably have expected to have developed or to have been 
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sold for potential development purposes absent the impact of the 
interstate. 
6. Based on the Courtfs careful reading of t he 
Friberg decision and its consideration of precedents in other 
jurisdictions, and after carefully evaluating all of the evidence 
introduced, the Court determines that June 22, 1977 is the date 
which is most likely to insure fundamental fairness in keeping 
with the constitutional mandate of just compensation. 
7. Defendants own property within the corridor of 
Interstate Highway 70, and were served with summons in eminent 
domain proceedings on or about the following dates: 
a. Laygo - October 15, 1987. 
b. Lind - October 12, 1987. 
c. Ogden - August 19, 1986. 
d. Springer - October 7, 1937. 
8. Orders of Immediate Occupancy were entered under 
the following dates: 
a. Laygo - October 28, 198 7 
b. Lind - October 28, 1987 
c. Ogden - September 10, 1986 
d. Springer - October 28, 198 7 
9. Interstate Highway 70 runs from Washington, D.C. 
on the east to its merger with Interstate Highway 15 near Cove 
Fort, and thence to Los Angeles. With the exception noted below 
the final segment of some three thousand miles of this interstate 
is being constructed immediately west of Richfield City, Sevier 
5 
County, Utah, where Defendant's property is located, 
10. Additional lanes are being completed in a remote 
stretch between Fremont Junction in Emery County and Green River, 
Utah, though the corridor was acquired and the Interstate has 
been opened in that area for many years. 
11. There is evidence indicating that this last 
construction west of Richfield was a result of the desire of 
Richfield City so that the businessmen could get the advantage of 
the business going through the City, However, it was not at the 
request of these property owners and the effects upon these 
property owners and the businessmen are entirely different. 
12. As a prerequisite to entry of the orders of 
immediate occupancy the Plaintiff tendered into cunt its 
appraised values of the properties being taken. Shortly 
thereafter these deposited funds were withdrawn by the respective 
Defendants. 
13. The Defendants do not challenge the right or the 
necessity of the taking and have raised no defenses relating 
thereto. Rather Defendants challenge the adequacy of the 
compensation which the Plaintiff has tendered. 
14. The Court holds that Defendants1 withdrawal of the 
funds deposited by the Plaintiff did not constitute a waiver or 
abandonment of their right f o question the appropriate date of 
valuation. The Court is of the opinion that the valuation date 
is a matter relating to compensation and not a defense to the 
taking. Accordingly the Court determines that §78-34-9 as it 
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r*~'ites u v.r.vor »" 2efenr,e his ;,r .if[ * i~ a' i o n . 
: ^ > > \ . +.-.r. t-^te through Sevier 
W i l oy v.i.-a fir^t ; • I M i : y announced . .- - h fie Id Reaper 
:;•;'*,n >r« i * t r-.j,,.r , M , 1,^;i Between that date and the fall of 
1987 there h.*ve L*.-.. r* r . .. . .' artiol - - chf ield Reaper 
regarding the interstate. 
• considered ihe newspaper articles 
not for the I x ul h < i the matters asserted, i»nt i<ither -is evidence 
I" .•• I! i t i r ;•; o i. t i o r. v;,- s r * b" i c i z e d . J) ho ] . «•. 11 a t e a . 
1 ', "Ihe CI-M.M t. 1 .ikes judicial notice tho't t-hp Richfield 
Reaper is a weekly newspaper published in Kl-n:. :, . • i 
County, St:ate of ht/ah ind has wi.de circulation in Sevier Valley. 
The evidence indicated that ihe I CM J I, wo-ekly circulation w a s 
approximately 3,000 copies. 
-..-.... 'Ui*'1 --rse of \ • - s foMewiiicj i r i * i a 1 
announcement of the interstate projeu =. . ; '- -..»'r 
p.;lo " *'/- i :o":p;*-^d cc.M^etion dates for -he interstate h.uh*ay 
through Sevier va.. .cy ;• . . -re tne ;'r;p^rf^es of 
the Defendants herein are located. The Reaper attr ,, •; • i - se 
projected oomplotion dates to UDOT Officials, The or' jections 
were inconsistent. They are as follow*: 
a. R i c h f i e l d Reapei '-••-." n 9 , -"Q<«- Projected 
c o m p l e t i o n \hi t,e w, < is I i / 7. 
b. Richfield Reaper, October ' £6: 
P r o j e c t e d c o in p 1 e t i o n d a t e w a s 197 0, 
c. Richfield Reaper, December 1, 1977: 
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Promoted cer:p] pf ion date v.-ss y.) y« \rs v*iy (presumably 1987). 
. •• \* i^uvember ^ , .>.Ji 
Projected completion *<n ir»^ Vf-d up • «> J '/9-PO. 
* *
 Ko projected completion dates has proved 
accurate, . d comple, i- .i »- ; ; ;* • J <c •: * e 
1990s, well •->,**•> ". years from f.e dcite ui : l s s i-:-ot 
announcement. 
Plaintiff com? 1 do ica ..• • ' .: -• .'j .' :» 
, : \h Sevier Valley, * o « 1 ' h*> ^ast side, one h<a • . i.ter 
and i ."io ^n i e , , * • J - ; *s the webt SA^*- 4f 
Rirhfiold City .-. 1 : * h.?i rafter referred *^ *c *-h<» " --.c 
"].<;:,'.:].., Vi t^ -~d n a '->nf incd area between the west 
hiljo o]:d Richfield's northwest J - ^ ^ I - -, . • * • ff 
was required to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement before 
the route COUM:1 be selected. 
21. On the 18th day of Karrh, 197/, tne hnvii unint'iital 
Iir.r.art 5": i -  ^ ,r-nt was ccr.rlet^d, <"^ d * he west Richfield alignment 
was officially approved _y ..e * !• C« — • - It 
was thereafter officially approved by the Federal Highway 
Admin i si j .if i i m - ' ^  
22, Select J^.» .,: 1 ,<* -jsi, a i Mjnmeni a 1 UIKJ in »= ; est 
side of Richfield .= *M through the property of these Defendants 
received ii i de * • front-page newspaper articles 
in the following e d i f i e s ^ the Richfieia Rea* * t , December 2, 
]97fiif March . "' «•- \h * 1 /• 
2 3 . . I. • 11 f f i r i a l *•;P 1 e<• t i nn, the 
8 
h e f o> <*~* r «,e ,4, t ;a . 
City reacted ? 
' •• *r . - * 31 1 P i'iy gen^r 1 J I y Vr.-:-vn . ?hortl y 
>* -'- •* • •;•**" *• finalized P ^ - k f i ^ d 
:.•": anticipated selection i •-
 i . \ 
<*• - * 1 location w a s published *s * <-. ,• - , r 1 ,io 
City'\> uf filial zoning ^ n -in •. ';: -,p of ! v\e 
R'.^hfipld Reaper, . <-.i;;^ lar r/ip reflect m<j ' - proposed vest 
alignment had U/t«n pnM i shod m tin* Iruiif p nj*? of the Reaper as 
early as September 7, 1972. "i he zone map lutlc^s: 
JMNV IMP 
*KHF€L0# UTAH 
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24, -Mchfiold City has h^d i p^liry ,: ao lining 
.!_ r-rr;o • , \ • <•r - t : r v:t v!*"hin the proposed interstate corridor 
as is evidenced by • ^e U w ,owing t^ --o . < . , j . f ;er 
Woody Farnsworth in UDOT vs. Partington, S, vier < iv11 - , * i<-. 9 . 
The following tost i mon/ w.rs receivrd in evidence pursuant to 
i-t i pulat i on, but with the proviso that th,p Cit-y is «.-. *<
 A ' • *
,,ui-
*• ' uuia the btaLe and is not control led thereby: 
Q. Thank you very much. u>.-. g your years of 
--perience with the city, :.^ting back into 
1970s with the City Council ~nd the 
banning Commission, has the city had a 
/ . . ^ M I policy toward the interstate highway? 
< * *' * w*t policy been? 
A. Generally, it consisted with not approving 
or allowing development around the fret.ay or 
freeway 1ano. [Farnsworth transcript p.19,] 
25. ' ' ;':*iiJ iff " is c.n< o^ra-jod the rity's p^1 : o? of 
declining to approve- o>, ... ; ^ o ;
 4i : • :—3 ^ - t i t n 
corridor. 
26. Ri«'.!vc". >^  orirr.*od dramatic n-von *n 
residential construction b^gluni,,;
 : - d 
contir.oi-'i through the decade. Beginning - .*, tN? y*-a." .:hore 
was a i -. •« • • ;,» M--:-- ^instruction. 
2". The f a u market vali:« t groun^ : „ • 3 
F •: r •-""• - " /• J- pin f suitable * residential i^velop:nent was 
substanti *.,r higher ~t 
1987. -pw,
 c; finding r-pplio to tano -djaoenv .;* * -veloped 
p.r *: ,^ *~ 'uadrant where Jefendants1 
10 
properties ^ ^ e y. ocated . 
^i>regoing determinat n the 
Court i plies n- t :ty . comparable a • wing 
f*-t(,ts relevant income capitalization apprcaoh 
appraising: *' J -r.r^-^^ 41 Richfield 
City evidencing reduction in i he noud !'ur h-^Iui^q ,.'ts. C :? 
i "- roa^-d • '"^* subdivision improvements. • i he increase in 
the cost : i L/ictn» * g^ to a wnu' . .. < ! s 
s% ; . vledge, v^irially taken, * t tho economic down--ui-i . . he 
rntire CG <2 9 osr-.a ^1. 1 he ^ iV K i ^ \r ,zc: i . * 
- i-. f- * y , ^  tueie iias h »?n reduced activ'. / * r. l.**nd vlovelopment 
-ird h«"?e construction *hA /. • , i . • « . • • K t 'in 
of land. i n general. The evidence supported these facts of which 
tl le Coi lr t - -<.-- •' - r " v 
29. During the 19*05, Iht- Uhds and the I o'u * , I ho. 
overwhelr; r .7 -,--?;T-- -, f resi ie-t ihi 1 growth ": Richfield v.:o- • :• he 
northwest ::•.•-> * 1 - •• s • • • t * :• s. 
30. The residential yi.^wWi t /^ .ii J t^e !.•..*,. .. ~ i 
t ,.••!'•:.! Defendants' properties continued m t i l the 19 '-l^'p time 
frar.e wl.^n there W-I.J; .1 JI.IHM * " ^ ewher<~ principally 
toward the southwest, with a lesser amount of development \& 
northeast. The Court finds this was caused by the interstate 
designation. 
31, Beginning in 1950 and continuing through ^id 1977 
approximately >u'l 1 I In .1 ifnl iv i s i ons nuwly approved w* where 
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substantial development occurred was located in ^u^ extreme 
nor thwest per *• i n>n ->f P i <:h f ield Ci t'y adjacent Lo or approaching 
the property of those Defendants, 
J?, Subsequent to mid 1977 only some approximately 1 0% 
of the subdivisioi is ni«wl;( .ipprovprl m i n \ JII substantial 
development occurred were located ir. -ie northwest portion 
Richf iold ''•ty, 
*) 1. The shitt t loin the northwest port ion 
commun.'**; <o other areas occurred when the natural growth t.. </4 is 
r * -i .• . •,(-.' proximity In I li interstate corridor, the location 
'', f v h i c h w a s w I d e 1 y k n own, 
34, The impending construction of the interstate 
altered loi ig estab] :l si led grow th iu\ l.tei ns and precluded 
residential development from, moving .MI I o i lie lands of these 
Defr •-? .:,• - , 
35. The C o m t : . .. : • * 
intprst^te tu*e subject properties had residential potent,3*! :* th 
v, , .; .-•*.' * - 'his iinding ^ ^ < y ^ • < <• o 
purpose j ruling <.n «'he pend;ng motions 
Defendants as W P I I as the Plaintiff is entitled to present to a 
juiy iv i b; l H " r IN i '"• ihc'ity »'»'" fr hn hiniw^ t- and b<rist iir-e fro which 
the various properties could have been put absent tne i in i IM.MH 'e 
of the interstate, 
3* T . ;< — -* ;" i w e 
reasonable access ': * , tiiities, \ncludij.o - - .-w^r, 
e ^ -: r , : • - axe reasonably proximate to 
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attractive neighborhoods in the highest area rf residential zone 
classification in Richfield City and in that sector of the 
community wherein most of the public parks, schools, churches and 
athletic fields exist. Further the subject properties are toward 
higher elevations vhirh have been attractive to home builders in 
communities throughout Utah. 
17, stoppage of the northwest residential growth 
pattern is related to the anticipated location of the interstate 
and not to the canal located in that area. The canal could be 
breached and had been breached before whenever desired by the 
City. Specifically, high quality residential development had 
spawned above the canal in close proximity to the property of 
these Defendants and outside of the designated interstate 
corridor. 
38. In the absence of the Interstate highway, there 
are no legal obstacles to the annexation to Richfield City and/or 
zone changes on any of Defendants1 properties. 
39. E.-ich of the Defendants has performed overt acts 
indicating a design to use their properties for residential 
purposes. 
40. it would have .served no useful purpose for these 
Defendants to have undertaken to further plat or develop their 
properties when they had full Icnowledge the properties would be 
taken for the interstate highway and when K irhfielcl «"*ity had a 
policy against any development within the contemplated corridor. 
Equity does not require the performance of useless acts. 
13 
41. Subsequent to the corridor selection on June 22, 
1977 there were modest shifts of the actual right-of-way lines 
and there was also a repositioning of the interchanges on b<i>th 
the north and south ends of Richfield. The west Richfield 
alignment however remained firmly designated from the time of its 
official selection until commencement of condemnation proceedings 
against these Defendants some 10 years later and some 30 years 
after the initial announcement of the freeway project , 
42. The right-of-way and interchange shifting, as well 
as the failure to finalize the design, did not reduce, but rather 
augmented the injury to the Defendant landowners, and extended 
the period of uncertainty during which their ability to exercise 
the incidents of property ownership was severely limited. 
43. The Court does not rely on a concept of fault or 
blame, but finds that there was "undue protraction . . . of the 
condemnation process11 within the meaning of the Friberg decision 
(at 830). For whatever reason it has taken the Plaintiff over 
thirty years to complete the project, the protraction has worked 
to the significant injury of the Defendant landowners. The Court 
sees no distinction between "undue protraction" after: the filing 
of suit, as in Friberg, and "undue protraction11 before the filing 
of suit. The matter of ultimate consequence is the undeimining 
of each Defendant landowners constitutional right to receive 
just compensation. 
44. The interstate highway created - condition 
precluding the development of Defendants1 properties or the sale 
14 
thereof for immediate or future development, 
45. As a practical matter these Defendants could not 
have developed their property nor sold it a fair price for tlle 
purpose of development. They were obliged to just hold their 
properties and pay the taxes on them until condemnation occurred. 
46. Because condemnation has occurred, the Defendants 
have lost the opportunity to retain their lands until market 
conditions improve. 
4 7, Even under Plaintiff's view of the evidence there 
has been a marked decline in the market value of potential 
subdivision land within or in reasonable proximity to Richfield 
City. Under Plaintiff's view of the evidence, market value 
peaked sometime i n between 19 7 7 a nd 1986 87 when these 
condemnation actions were commenced. Plaintiff claimed the value 
peaked during or about 1980 and that the 1977 and 1986-87 values 
are comparable. Plaintiff claims thereby a failure to meet the 
requirement of the Friberg decision which refers to a 
"substantial difference" in value between the date of service of 
summons and the date of valuation being considered. 
48. The Court does not accept Plaintiff's view of the 
evidence, having determined that ma/ket: -value would have been 
substantially higher in 1977 than in 1986-87. More importantly, 
the facts as advanced by Plaintiff, even i £ true, would not cure 
the injustice to these Defendants. Under such a siti nation they 
would be chained to their land while the market went up and then 
back down. Both sides concur that ih- r-.rV.--t 7 s now down. 
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49. The Defendants have met the burden of overcoming 
the statutory presumption, tl lat the valuation date be fixed on the 
date summons is served. This date would not lead to just 
compensation, 
50. The Court further determines that the Defendants 
are entitled to recover interest at the statutory rate of 81 from 
and after the elate fixed for valuation. At all tiroes from June 
22, 1911, forward each of the Defendants was effectively 
precluded from exercising important incidents of ownership over 
their lands and were obliged to abandon all but the most nominal 
kind of use* None of the Defendants received any return on thfir 
property between June 22, 1977 and the date of institution of the 
condemnation actions. A likely exception exists with respect to 
the Lind home. While its marketability would have been severely 
limited there may have been usage value to its owner. The Court 
reserves jurisdiction regarding the application of interest vis-
a-vis the rental value thereof. 
51. In determining to impose interest the Court has 
considered the statute which provides for interest only frura i he 
date of service of summons, or from the date of actual occupancy 
(§78-34-y). While: this statute may be constitutionally sound in 
the overwhelming number of cases, its application under the fact's 
of these cases would deprive these Defendants of just 
compensation, and therefore would be in violation the 
constitutional requirement. In this connection the Court notes 
the Friberg language to the effect that "just compensation means 
16 
that the owners must be put in as good a position money wise as 
they would ft .we occupied had their property not been taken.11 
Further, the Court is aware of decisions of the Utah Supreme 
Court which predate the Friberq decision and which have strictly 
applied §7 8-3 4-9 regarding the payment of interest. Specifically 
the Court has considered City of South Oaden vs. Fuiiki, 621 P. 2d 
1254 (Utah 1980) and State vs. Peek, 1 U.2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 
(Utah 1953). While Fuiiki was cited jn Friberg. the interest 
issue was not faced since the valuation date was moved forward. 
The Court is of the opinion that these cases have not fully come 
to grips with the constitutional requirement of ;nst compensation 
and also with the constitutional concept enunciated by the 
United States Supreme Court in United States vs. Causby, 328 U.S. 
256 at 261. In that case the Court stated: 
It is the owners loss, not the taker's gain 
which is the measure of the value of the 
property taken. 
52. As heretofore noted, Plaintiff claims a 
substantial^ similar market value in 1977 and 1986-87, but 
claims a substantially higher market value during the interim. 
If the Court were to accept this evidence as a basis for 
declining *o rhar.ge the valuation date, or for declining to 
require payment of interest, then Defendants would be put in 1 he 
untenable position of having their land held hostage for 10 years 
while the market went UJD an down without a i: easonable opportunity 
to sell at fair value and without any return on the property 
during the interim. To award Defendants the same compensation 10 
17 
years later without interest would not be just. As noted by the 
Friberg court: 
The constitutional requirement of just 
compensation derives Mas much content from 
the basic equitable principles of fairness as 
it does from technical concepts of property 
law . • . [at 828] [Emphasis added] 
DATED this 
DON V; TIBBS 
\ DISTRICT COURT/JUDGE 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING -> 
. hereby cei'tify that a full, true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing FINDINGS AND CONCUDSIONS was placed in 
the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-class 
postage thereon fully prepai ; i..-. * -5 <- ~^—day of March, 1989, 
addressed as follows: 
Mr. Stephen C. Ward 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
UDOT vs. Ogden, UDOT vs. Lind 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 114 
Mr. Alan S. Bachman 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
UDOT vs. Laygo, UDOT vs. Springer 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City# Utah 84III 4 
n!/. 
KEN CHAMBERLAIN 
TEX R. OLSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants Ogden, 
Lind, Laygo, Springer 
225 North 100 East 
P. 0. Box 100 
Richfield, Utah 84 7 01 
Telephone: 801 896-5441 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff, 
WALTER M. OGDEN AND SONS, 
INC., and SEVIER COUNTY 
TREASURER, 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENT TO FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS 
Civil No, 86-8-98 37 
vs, 
RULON LIND and FLORA S. LIND, 
his wife, Trustor; CORPORATION 
OF THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF 
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS,Beneficiary; 
and SEVIER COUNTY TREASURER, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 10128 
vs. 
LAYGO COMPANY, a partnership, 
CHRISTIE RICHARDS, JANICE 
PARKER, LEANE JARRETTE, and 
JEAN YOUNG, 
Civ I I No 10112 
Defendant. 
2 
vs, 
J. D. SPRINGER, 
Defendant* 
Civil No. 10131 
Pursuant 1 o 1 ho objections filed by Plaintiff, the 
Court supplements its Findings and Conclusions in the following 
particulars: 
The fifty-two numbered paragraphs set forth in the 
Court's Findings and Conclusions are divided into the following 
catagories: 
Findings of Fact: 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
Paragraph 
number 5, 
number 7, 
number 8, 
number 9, 
number 10 
number 11 
number 12 
number 13 
number 15 
number 17 
number 18 
number 19 
number 20 
number 21 
number 22 
number 23 
number 24 
number 25 
number 26 
number 27 
number 28 
number 29 
number 30 
number 31 
number 32 
number 3 3 
number 34 
number 35 
3 
Paragraph number 36, 
Paragraph number 37, 
Paragraph number 38, 
Paragraph number 39, 
Paragraph number 41, 
Paragraph number 42, 
Paragraph number 44, 
Paragraph number 45, 
Paragraph number 46. 
b. Mixed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law: 
Paragraph number 3, 
Paragraph number 4, 
Paragraph number 6/ 
Paragraph number 16, 
Paragraph number 40, 
Paragraph number 43, 
Paragraph number 47, 
Paragraph number 48, 
Paragraph number 49, 
Paragraph number 50, 
Paragraph number 52. 
c. Conclusions of Law: 
Paragraph number 1, 
Paragraph number 2, 
Paragraph number 14, 
Paragraph number 51. 
2. With respect to Plaintiff's objection numbered 36, 
the Court enters the following additional conclusions of law 
which are assigned the numbers which chronologically follow the 
Findings and Conclusions previously entered: 
53. The Court holds that the Governmental Immunity Act 
[63-30-1] is inapplicable. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act 
serve to give notice to the affected governmental entity so that 
it can promptly investigate and remedy defects before additional 
injury is caused. The acts negatively impacting these Defendants 
4 
properties were instigated by the Plaintiff, and its knowledge 
and awareness were at all times superior to the knowledge of the 
landowners. Compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act would 
have served no useful purpose under the facts of these cases and 
would likely have been counterproductive since the relevant facts 
were still in a state of development. 
54. The Court concludes that the proper approach to 
insure compliance with the constitutional mandate of just 
compensation in a case involving the unique facts present here is 
for the Court to consider the proper valuation date after all the 
operative facts are known and the condemning agency institutes 
action. This approach is preferable to the premature institution 
of condemnation proceeding whether they be instituted by the 
condemning agency, or by the injured landowner in an inverse 
condemnation action. The Court is mindful of the Supreme Court 
ruling in Salt Lake County vs. Rarooselli, 567 P. 2d 182 (Utah 
1977), and also of the legislature's adoption of 78-34-19 UCA in 
1981. The Ramoselli opinion as well as the cited statute 
indicate the inappropriate nature of premature condemnation 
proceedings by whomever commenced. In this respect they arguably 
support rather than undercut the approach taken by this Court 
herein* 
DATED this /? day of April, 1989. 
• • * . . . . , • 
DON V.-TIBBS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing SUPPLEMENT TO FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
was placed in the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with 
first-class postage thereon fully prepaid on the /Q day of 
April, 1989, addressed as follows: 
Mr. Stephen C. Ward 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
UDOT vs. Ogden, UDOT vs. Lind 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Mr. Alan S. Bachman 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
UDOT vs. Laygo, UDOT vs. Springer 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
KEN CHAMBERLAIN 
TEX R. OLSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant Ogden 
225 North 100 East 
P. O. Box 100 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: 801 896-5441 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF : 
TRANSPORTATION, : 
: ORDER FIXING VALUATION 
Plaintiff, : DATE AND PROVIDING FOR 
: PAYMENT OF INTEREST 
vs. : 
WALTER M. OGDEN AND SONS, : 
INC., and SEVIER COUNTY : 
TREASURER, : 
: Civil No. 86-8-9837 
Defendant. : 
The instant case was informally consolidated with three 
other cases1 for the purpose of holding an evidentiary hearing on 
motions filed by the Defendants in each of the cases requesting 
the Court to fix a valuation date other than the date on which 
summons were served. 
The Court heard evidence beginning Thursday, March 9, 
1989, and continuing through Monday, March 13, 1989. The Court 
has entered extensive Findings and Conclusions and now enters the 
1
 The companion cases are UDOT vs. Lind et al.. Sevier 
Civil No. 10128, UDOT vs. Layqo et al.. Sevier Civil No. 10132, 
UDOT vs. J. D. Springer, Sevier Civil No. 10131. 
2 
following order: 
1. The date of valuation in the instant case shall be 
June 22, 1977. 
2. Interest at the rate of 8% per annum shall run 
from the date of valuation until the date of entry of final 
judgment. 
3. Insofar as it may be legally permissable, the 
Court determines that this is a final order under Rule 54(b). 
4. The Court determines there is no just reason for 
delaying an appeal herein and to the contrary there would be a 
great loss in judicial economy if an appeal were not prosecuted 
at this time. 
5. In the event it should be determined that an 
appeal does not lie from this order as a matter of right under 
Rule 54(b), then the Court encourages the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal pursuant to Rule 5, Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. This Court is of the opinion that this order 
involves substantial rights which will materially effect the 
final decision and that an appeal at this stage will better serve 
the administration and interests of justice. 
DATED this /f) day of^terah^ 1989. 
* ^ 
DON V. T] 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
\ -i A J L ^ 
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing ORDER FIXING VALUATION DATE AND PROVIDING 
FOR PAYMENT OF INTEREST was placed in the United States mail at 
Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid 
on the day of March, 1989, addressed as follows: 
Mr. Stephen C. Ward 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
UDOT vs. Ogden, UDOT vs. Lind 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
i 
KEN CHAMBERLAIN 
TEX R. OLSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
225 North 100 East 
P. O. Box 100 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: (801) 896-5441 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF : 
TRANSPORTATION, : 
: ORDER FIXING VALUATION 
Plaintiff, : DATE AND PROVIDING FOR 
: PAYMENT OF INTEREST 
vs. : 
RULON LIND and FLORA S. LIND, his : 
wife, Trustor; CORPORATION OF THE : 
PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF : 
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, : 
Beneficiary; and SEVIER COUNTY 
TREASURER, : 
: Civil No. 10128 
Defendant. ; 
The instant case was informally consolidated with three 
other cases1 for the purpose of holding an evidentiary hearing on 
motions filed by the Defendants in each of the cases requesting 
the Court to fix a valuation date other than the date on which 
summons were served. 
The Court heard evidence beginning Thursday, March 9, 
1
 The companion cases are UDOT vs. Qgden et al., Sevier 
Civil No. 86-8-9837, UDOT vs. Layqo et al.. Sevier Civil No. 
10132, UDOT vs. J. D. Springer. Sevier Civil No. 10131. 
2 
1989, and continuing through Monday, March 13, 1989- The Court 
has entered extensive Findings and Conclusions and now enters the 
following order: 
1. The date of valuation in the instant case shall be 
June 22, 1977. 
2. Interest at the rate of 8% per annum shall run 
from the date of valuation until the date of entry of final 
judgment. 
3. Insofar as it may be legally permissable, the 
Court determines that this is a final order under Rule 54(b). 
4. The Court determines there is no just reason for 
delaying an appeal herein and to the contrary there would be a 
great loss in judicial economy if an appeal were not prosecuted 
at this time. 
5. In the event it should be determined that an 
appeal does not lie from this order as a matter of right under 
Rule 54(b), then the Court encourages the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal pursuant to Rule 5, Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. This Court is of the opinion that this order 
involves substantial rights which will materially effect the 
final decision and that an appeal at this stage will better serve 
the administration and interests of justice. 
DATED this /fi/^—da^-fif jjarcfry 1989. 
,J& 
DON V. TI£BS 
DISTRICT CODRT-^ UDGE 
3 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing ORDER FIXING VALUATION DATE AND PROVIDING 
FOR PAYMENT OF INTEREST was placed in the United States mail at 
Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid 
on the 3C j>~day of March, 1989, addressed as follows: 
Mr. Stephen C. Ward 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
UDOT vs. Ogden, UDOT vs. Lind 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
KEN CHAMBERLAIN 
TEX R. OLSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
225 North 100 East 
P. 0. Box 100 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: (801) 896-5441 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF : 
TRANSPORTATION, 
: ORDER FIXING VALUATION 
Plaintiff, : DATE AND PROVIDING FOR 
: PAYMENT OF INTEREST 
vs. : 
J. D. SPRINGER, : 
: Civil No. 10131 
Defendant. : 
The instant case was informally consolidated with three 
other cases1 for the purpose of holding an evidentiary hearing on 
motions filed by the Defendants in each of the cases requesting 
the Court to fix a valuation date other than the date on which 
summons were served. 
The Court heard evidence beginning Thursday, March 9, 
1989, and continuing through Monday, March 13, 1989. The Court 
has entered extensive Findings and Conclusions and now enters the 
following order: 
1
 The companion cases are UDOT vs. Ogden et a L , Sevier 
Civil No. 86-8-9837, UDOT vs. Laygo et al., Sevier Civil No. 
10132, UDOT vs. Lind, Sevier Civil No. 10128. 
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1. The date of valuation in the instant case shall be 
June 22, 1977. 
2. Interest at the rate of 8% per annum shall run 
from the date of valuation until the date of entry of final 
judgment. 
3. Insofar as it may be legally permissable, the 
Court determines that this is a final order under Rule 54 (b) . 
4. The Court determines there is no just reason for 
delaying an appeal herein and to the contrary there would be a 
great loss in judicial economy if an appeal were not prosecuted 
at this time. 
5. In the event it should be determined that an 
appeal does not lie from this order as a matter of right under 
Rule 54(b), then the Court encourages the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal pursuant to Rule 5, Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. This Court is of the opinion that this order 
involves substantial rights which will materially effect the 
final decision and that an appeal at this stage will better serve 
the administration and interests of justice. 
DATED this f£ day of 1989. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing ORDER FIXING VALUATION DATE AND PROVIDING 
FOR PAYMENT OF INTEREST was placed in the United States mail at 
Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid 
on the 351^- day of March, 1989, addressed as follows: 
Mr, Alan S. Bachman 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
UDOT vs. Laygo, UDOT vs. Springer 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
KEN CHAMBERLAIN 
TEX R. OLSEN 
A t t o r n e y s f o r Defendant 
225 North 100 East 
P. 0 . Box 100 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: (801) 896-5441 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF : 
TRANSPORTATION, : 
ORDER FIXING VALUATION 
Plaintiff, : DATE AND PROVIDING FOR 
PAYMENT OF INTEREST 
vs. : 
LAYGO COMPANY, a partnership, : 
CHRISTIE RICHARDS, JANICE 
PARKER, LEANE JARRETTE, and : 
JEAN YOUNG, : 
Civil No. 10132 
Defendant. : 
The instant case was informally consolidated with three 
other cases1 for the purpose of holding an evidentiary hearing on 
motions filed by the Defendants in each of the cases requesting 
the Court to fix a valuation date other than the date on which 
summons were served. 
The Court heard evidence beginning Thursday, March 9, 
1989, and continuing through Monday, March 13, 1989. The Court 
1
 The companion cases are UDOT vs. Oqden et al., Sevier 
Civil No. 86-8-9837, UDOT vs. Lind et al.. Sevier Civil No. 
10128, UDOT vs. J. D. Springer, Sevier Civil No. 10131. 
2 
has entered extensive Findings and Conclusions and now enters the 
following order: 
1. The date of valuation in the instant case shall be 
June 22, 1977. 
2. Interest at the rate of 8% per annum shall run 
from the date of valuation until the date of entry of final 
judgment. 
3. Insofar as it may be legally permissable, the 
Court determines that this is a final order under Rule 54(b). 
4. The Court determines there is no just reason for 
delaying an appeal herein and to the contrary there would be a 
great loss in judicial economy if an appeal were not prosecuted 
at this time. 
5. In the event it should be determined that an 
appeal does not lie from this order as a matter of right under 
Rule 54(b), then the Court encourages the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal pursuant to Rule 5, Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. This Court is of the opinion that this order 
involves substantial rights which will materially effect the 
final decision and that an appeal at this stage will better serve 
the administration and interests of justice. 
3 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing ORDER FIXING VALDATION DATE AND PROVIDING 
FOR PAYMENT OF INTEREST was placed in the United States mail at 
Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid 
on the X1 ^  day of March, 1989, addressed as follows: 
Mr, Alan S. Bachman 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
UDOT vs. Laygo, UDOT vs. Springer 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
i 
